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Abstract
This study develops an on-the-job search model involving spatial structure. In this model,
workers are either employed and commuting frequently to a central business district (CBD)
or unemployed and commuting less frequently to the CBD to search for a job. When an
unemployed worker succeeds in off-the-job search, the quality of the job match is deter-
mined stochastically: a good match yields high-productivity whereas a bad match yields
low-productivity. Although a high-productivity worker does not search for a new job, a low-
productivity worker decides whether to conduct an on-the-job search, which would require
additional commuting to the CBD. Analysis of this model demonstrates that in equilib-
rium, the relocation path of workers corresponds to their career path, while welfare analysis
demonstrates that such a spatial structure distorts firms’ decision regarding the posting of
vacancies.
JEL classification: J64; R14; R23
Keywords: City structure; On-the-job search; Unemployment; Efficiency; Relocation and career
paths;
1 Introduction
There is no doubt that urban areas currently play a dominant role as areas of employment
and residence throughout the world.1 In many cities, people live in suburbs and commute
from there to business districts. How does the structure of a city and commuting relate to job
creation and unemployment within it? Recently, several studies have addressed this question
by combining urban and labor economics. Some of these studies have succeeded in providing
answers to a certain part of this question by developing search and matching models within
urban structures.2
Wasmer and Zenou [15] introduced a monocentric city structure a la Alonso [1] into a job
search model based on the key assumption that workers’ search intensity is negatively affected
by access to jobs that are concentrated within a Central Business District (CBD). Such an
assumption leads to multiple urban configurations in equilibrium, including that of unemployed
worker residing close to jobs or that of unemployed workers residing distant from jobs, with the
∗Corresponding author, Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University, e-mail: hge005kk@mail2.econ.osaka-
u.ac.jp
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1United Nations [14] reports that in 2000, 76 percent of the population in developed countries and 39 percent
of the population in developing countries resided and worked in urbanized areas.
2There are also studies that have addressed this question by using other types of models and have yielded
interesting findings. For instance, Zenou [17] adopted an efficiency wage model involving an urban structure. He
found that firms do not recruit workers who reside at an excessive distance from the place of work because their
productivity is lower than that of workers residing more proximate to the place of work.
later configuration being consistent with the well-known spatial mismatch hypothesis.3 Smith
and Zenou [13] demonstrated that when search intensity is determined endogenously, another
type of configuration is obtained in equilibrium: there are two areas where unemployed workers
reside, one of which is close to the CBD and the other of which is distant from the CBD.
Employed workers live in between these two areas.
Crampton [3] analyzed worker’s simultaneous decision regarding job search and residential
areas. Rouwendal [9] demonstrated the possibility of excessive commuting due to the existence
of information asymmetry in the job search process. Sato [12] analyzed how city structure affects
workers’ job-acceptance behavior and the labor market by introducing city structure into a search
model with workers’ decision to accept a job offer. He found that reductions in the urban costs
of living such as commuting costs, increase the likelihood that job seekers will accept job offers.
Zenou [19] proposed a spatial search model in which both job creation and job destruction are
endogenous. He demonstrated that in equilibrium, workers with high productivity and wages
live close to jobs, have low per distance commuting costs, and pay high land rents. He also
showed that higher per distance commuting costs and higher unemployment benefits lead to
more job destruction. Zenou [20] developed a spatial search model in which firms post wages.
He found by simulation that when workers have different value imputed to leisure and different
equilibrium wages, a reduction in commuting costs for all workers reduces the unemployment
rate of high-wage workers and the profit of all firms while increasing the wages of all workers
and the proportion of firms paying the high wage.45
This study focuses on a different significant aspect of job search, namely, on-the-job search,
i.e., we introduce the possibility that employed workers search for a new job. It is often observed
that employed workers search for a new job when they are unsatisfied with their current jobs.
We also observe that people change their locations when they land a new job and obtain higher
wage income. This study explores the possible interactions between such a career path in the
labor market and a relocation path in the urban land market. To do so, the monocentric city
model a la Alonso [1] is introduced in the on-the-job search model developed by Pissarides [7],
in which workers are either employed or unemployed. An employed worker frequently commutes
to the CBD to work while an unemployed worker commutes less frequently to the CBD in order
to search for a job. When an unemployed worker succeeds in obtaining a job (i.e. succeeds
in off-the-job search), the quality of the job match is determined stochastically: a good match
yields high productivity whereas a bad match leads to low productivity.
Although high productivity workers do not search for a new job, low productivity workers de-
cide whether or not she/he looks for a new job. On-the-job search requires additional commuting
to the CBD, which leads to the following urban configuration: currently employed job seekers
(on-the-job searchers) live closest to the CBD, unemployed workers (off-the-job searchers) live
most distant from the CBD, and employed workers not searching for a new position (non-job-
searchers) live in between the former two. In this model, spatial relocation corresponds to a
career path, with the career path from unemployment to employment or from on-the-job search
3First stated by Kain [5], the spatial hypothesis posits that job decentralization to the suburbs without the
residential movement of African Americans has led to a high unemployment rate and low wages paid in inner-city
neighborhoods, where African Americans are concentrated. Since then, a large number of empirical studies testing
this hypothesis have offered much evidence for its support (see Preston and McLafferty [8] for a survey of recent
empirical studies).
4For a comprehensive survey of this literature, see Zenou [18], among others.
5Sato [10] [11] also developed a job search model involving a monocentric city structure. However, he assumed
that because all types of workers have the same commuting costs and the same level of housing consumption, the
residential location of a particular type of worker cannot be determined. Therefore, he focused on the effects of
the overall cost of living, which depends on the population size of the city, on the local labor market. Sato [10]
investigated the relationship between wage and unemployment differences among different cities in inter-urban
equilibrium. Sato [11] found a link between agglomeration economies and the worker-firm matching process, as
did Wheeler [16] in a separate study using a different model. Sato [11] provided the conditions of the matching
process necessary for the existence of agglomeration economies as well.
2
to a good-match entailing relocation from the outskirts of a city to an inner part of the city or
from the innermost area of the city to the suburbs.
In this spatial equilibrium, the wages of low productivity workers are lower when they live
closer to the CBD. In the model proposed here, residing proximate to the CBD signals that a
worker is an on-the-job seeker, which decreases the bargaining position of the worker and reduces
her/his wages. Spatial structure also impacts the efficiency of the properties of the model. This
model proposes that whereas decision regarding an on-the-job search is efficient, firms’ decision
regarding job vacancies is distorted even under the Hosios condition (Hosios [4]), which contrasts
with the findings of related studies of spatial off-the-job search models, such as those of Wasmer
and Zenou [15] and Zenou [18].
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic structure of the model.
Section 3 demonstrates the existence of and the properties of a unique equilibrium. Section 4
addresses issues regarding welfare and Section 5 presents the study conclusions.
2 Model
Consider a closed, linear, and monocentric city whose land is owned by absentee landlords. It
has one CBD, the location of which is approximated by one point and within which all firms are
assumed to be exogenously located.6 A continuum of risk-neutral workers of size N live within
the city, each of which exits the labor market according to a random Poisson process with the
exogenous aggregate rate δ > 0. Such an exit is replaced by an entry of a new worker, who first
searches for a job as an unemployed worker. This assumption keeps the total number of workers
constant. Although identical ex ante, the workers become heterogeneous after entering the
labor market due to the occurrence of stochastic events, with u of N being unemployed workers
and N − u being employed workers. While unemployed workers search for a job, employed
workers earn wage income that depends on their productivity y, which is either high or low and
determined randomly upon the job match, with a good match yielding productivity yh and a
bad match yielding productivity yl. A subscript h (l) represents that the variable is related to
a good (bad) match. We assume that yh > yl and Pr(y = yl) = Pr(y = yh) = 1/2. Moreover,
it is assumed that yl is sufficiently large such that even if a match yields low productivity, the
worker prefers to be employed rather than unemployed, and her/his employer does not dismiss
her/him. We assume that on-the-job search is possible, such that a low-productivity worker can
search for a new job while working.
In the city, all workers occupy the same amount of land (normalized to 1) outside the CBD.
We assume that the density of land is 1, implying that x units of housing are located within a
distance x of the CBD.
In this paper, it is assumed that the sole commuting cost is that of the time expended in
doing so. Each worker is endowed with one unit of time, that she/he uses for working, searching,
commuting and leisure. Assume that an employed worker must expend a fixed amount of time
hw (> 0) on work activities and that the job search requires a fixed amount of time hs (> 0).
Moreover, we assume that the commuting time to the CBD is σwx for an employed worker
and σux for an unemployed worker. Here, commuting is necessary for an unemployed worker
to be interviewed. We assume that hw > hs and σw ≥ σu: working at a job requires more
time and frequent commuting than does searching for a job. A worker is assumed to obtain
the instantaneous utility ul(l) from leisure, where u
0
l > 0 and u
00
l < 0. The time for leisure is
given by lu = 1− hs − σux for an unemployed worker, l1e = 1− hw − hs − σwx for an employed
worker who is searching for a new position (i.e., an on-the-job searcher), l0e = 1− hw − σwx for
an employed worker who is not searching.
6This model of a centralized city can easily be modified to describe a decentralized city by locating all firms
within a suburban business district that is located at one end of a linear city. Such a modification would not alter
the results of this study.
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Based on these assumptions, the decrease in utility resulting from living more distantly from
the CBD can be expressed as follows:
∂ul(lu)
∂x
= −σuu0l(1− hs − σux),
∂ul(l1e)
∂x
= −σwu0l(1− hw − hs − σwx),
∂ul(l0e)
∂x
= −σwu0l(1− hw − σwx).
Assuming that hw > hs and σw ≥ σu implies that lu > l0e > l1e for a given x. Because
σuu0l(lu) < σwu
0
l(l
0
e) < σwu
0
l(l
1
e) is readily known from u
00 < 0, the marginal cost of commuting
is the highest for on-the-job searchers and the lowest for unemployed workers, as expressed by
the followings:
0 >
∂ul(lu)
∂x
>
∂ul(l1e)
∂x
>
∂ul(l0e)
∂x
.
For the sake of analytical tractability, we adopt the simplest way of describing commuting cost.
Specifically, commuting cost is described by linear functions of the distance x from the CBD
such that it is τx for an employed worker not searching for a new job, (1+s∗)τx for an on-the-job
searcher, and sτx for an unemployed worker, where τ , s∗ and s are exogenous and satisfy that
τ > 0 and 0 < s∗ ≤ s < 1.78
Because of these assumptions, as is demonstrated in Section 3, the equilibrium urban con-
figuration is such that on-the-job searchers reside most proximate to the CBD, unemployed
workers reside most distant from the CBD, and employed workers not searching for a job reside
between the first two groups. The cost of living in the city is the sum of the residential land
rent R(x) and the commuting cost: it is R(x) + τx for an employed worker not searching for a
job, R(x) + (1 + s∗)τx for an on-the-job searcher, and R(x) + stx for an unemployed worker.
Although workers are identical ex ante, they are heterogeneous in terms of place of residence
x, employment status (employed or unemployed), productivity (high or low), and job search
activity (no search, on-the-job search, or off-the-job search). Following Burdett and Mortensen
[2] and Pissarides [7], on-the-job search by firms is assumed to be impossible, i.e., firms cannot
search for a new worker for an already filled job.
2.1 Matching framework
There are v firms that have vacancies and search for workers. Each of them posts one vacancy,
which can be filled by only one worker. Let es denote the number of on-the-job searchers and
φ denote the efficiency of their on-the-job search. We normalize the efficiency of off-the-job
search to one. Job matches are generated by a Poisson process with the aggregate rate of
M = m(u+ φes, v), where u+ φes represents the number of job searchers in terms of efficiency
units. m(·, ·), which is defined on R+ × R+, is assumed to be strictly increasing in both
arguments, twice differentiable, strictly concave, and homogeneous of degree one. We also
assume that m(·, ·) satisfies 0 ≤M ≤ min[u+ φe, v], m(u+ φes, 0) = m(0, v) = 0 and the Inada
condition for both arguments.
7More precisely, it is assumed that the value of leisure measured is given by
ul(lu) = b− sτx,
ul(l
1
e) = bb− (τ + s∗)x,
ul(l
0
e) = bb− τx,
where b and bb are constants that represent the value of leisure at location x = 0. We normalize bb to zero.
8s and s∗ can be interpreted as indicators of search intensity. For a discussion on the endogenous determinant
of search intensity, see Smith and Zenou [13] and Wasmer and Zenou [15].
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Job matching occurs at the rate of p(θ) = M/(u + φes) = m(1, θ) for each unemployed
workers, φp(θ) for each on-the-job searchers, and q(θ) =M/v = m(1/θ, 1) for a firm seeking to
fill a vacancy, where θ is the measure of labor market tightness defined as θ = v/(u+φes).From
the assumptions regarding m(·, ·), we obtain that p(θ)(u+φe) = q(θ)v, dp/dθ > 0 and dq/dθ < 0
for any θ ∈ (0,+∞). We can also see that limθ→0 p = 0, limθ→∞ p = ∞, limθ→0 q = ∞ and
limθ→∞ q = 0. If φ = 0, this model becomes a model without the presence of on-the-job search.
For the sake of descriptive simplicity, an on-the-job searcher is assumed to move to a new job
if the new job provides her/him with the same or a larger asset value as does the current job.
As is standard in on-the-job search models, it is assumed that firms, upon meeting a worker, do
not know whether she/he is an on-the-job searcher or an off-the-job searcher.
2.2 Value functions
Let Wj(x), U(x), Jj(x) and V denote the asset value of an employed worker, an unemployed
worker, a firm with a filled job, and a firm with a vacancy, respectively. j represents the
productivity of a match (i.e., high (h) or low (l), j ∈ {h, l}). x describes the worker’s residential
location (x ∈ [0,∞)), which is the distance to the CBD. In Jj(x), x refers to the residential
location of a worker employed by the firm.
The asset value of an unemployed worker who lives at x is, therefore, given by
(r + δ)U(x) = b+
p(θ)
2
X
j∈{h,l}
¡
Wmaxj − U(x)
¢
−R(x)− sτx, (1)
whereWmaxj = maxx∈[0,∞]Wj(x). r, b, and R(x) represent the discount rate, the value of leisure,
and the market land rent, respectively, with r and b being positive constants and R(x) being
determined endogenously. It is assumed that even a bad match yields a value sufficiently lager
than the value of leisure. The first term of (1) is the instantaneous utility of being unemployed
while the second term is the expected capital gain from off-the-job search. An unemployed
worker is matched to a job at the rate of p(θ), with the match yielding high (low) productivity
at a probability of 1/2 (1/2), leading to an asset value of Wmaxh (W
max
l ). The third and fourth
terms are the land rent and the location-dependent cost of off-the-job search, respectively. As
previous explained, it is assumed that an unemployed worker will accept any type of job when
she/he has a chance of making a match.
The asset value of an employed worker with productivity j is described as
(r + δ)Wj(x) = wj(x) + λ(Umax −Wj(x)) (2)
+ max
i∈{0,1}
⎧
⎨
⎩i
⎛
⎝φp(θ)
2
X
j0∈{h,l}
max
£
Wmaxj0 −Wj(x), 0
¤
− s∗τx
⎞
⎠
⎫
⎬
⎭−R(x)− τx,
where Umax = maxx∈[0,∞] U , wj(x) is the wage and λ is the exogenous job separation rate. The
first and second terms are the instantaneous utility obtained from the wage income and the
capital loss from job separation, respectively. The third term represents the expected net return
from on-the-job search, which is the expected capital gain (φp(θ)/2)
P
j0 max
h
Wmaxj0 −Wj(x), 0
i
from on-the-job search minus the cost s∗τx of it. If the net return is non-negative, an employed
worker will search for a new job (i = 1), but will not do so if it is negative (i = 0).
While it is assumed that firms do not know whether employees are searching for a new job,
it is assumed that firms know where employees live. Based on the knowledge of its employees’
residential location and productivity, a firm can makes the belief regarding whether its employee
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is doing an on-the-job search. The asset values of firms are given by
rJj(x) = yj − wj(x) + (λ+ δ + i∗φp(θ))(V − Jj(x)), (3)
rV = −c+ q(θ)
2
X
j∈{h,l}
(Jj(x)− V ), (4)
where yj is the output of a match yielding productivity j, c is the cost of posting a vacancy, and
i∗ is the firm’s belief regarding whether an employee is looking for a new job. As later discussed
in more detail, such a belief must be consistent with the relationship among the productivity of
the match, the residential location of the employee, and her/his job search status. In (3), the
first and second terms describe instantaneous profits while the third term represents capital loss
from job destruction resulting from job separation (λ) of the employee, her/his exit (δ) from
the labor market, and her/his job turnover (i∗φp(θ)). In (4), the first and second terms are the
(instantaneous) cost of recruitment and the capital gain from filling a vacancy.
Equilibrium is determined by (i) the outcome of wage bargaining (Section 2.3), (ii) labor mar-
ket conditions (the free entry of firms and on-the-job search decision of employees, as described
in Section 2.4), (iii) land market conditions (locational arbitrage and bid rent, as described in
Section 2.5) and (iv) steady state conditions.
2.3 Wage determination
Following Pissarides [7], wages are assumed to be determined by the first-order condition of the
Nash bargaining conducted between a firm and an employee:
(1− β)(Wj(x)− Umax) = β(Jj(x)− V ). (5)
This relationship can also be expressed as Wj(x)− Umax = β(Wj(x) + Jj(x)− Umax − V ). As
β represents the labor share of the total surplus, it indicates the bargaining power of a worker.
Note that as employee’s job searching status is private information, it does not affect her/his
wages directly, but does so indirectly because it is determined by her/his residential location,
which is public information and a factor considered in wage bargaining.
2.4 Labor market conditions
As will be formally described in Section 2.5, it is assumed that workers can move freely within
the city and face no costs of relocation, implying that the asset value of a worker is the same
across locations by locational arbitrage, as is expressed in (6):
Wj(x) =Wj and U(x) = U, ∀x. (6)
Moreover, from the wage determination rule (5), we obtain
Jj(x) = Jj , ∀x. (7)
Assuming the free entry and exit of firms, when the value V of posting a vacancy is positive,
more firms will post vacancies, and when V is negative, some firms will stop posting vacancies.
In equilibrium, V is driven to zero. Combined with V = 0 and (7), (4) leads to the following
free entry condition:
2c
q(θ)
=
X
j∈{h,l}
Jj . (8)
From (5), (6) and (7), the value (1) of an unemployed worker becomes
(r + δ)U = b+
βp(θ)
2(1− β)
X
j∈{h,l}
(Jj − V )−R(x)− sτx,
6
which, combined with V = 0 and (8), leads to
(r + δ)U = b+
βcθ
1− β −R(x)− sτx. (9)
Similarly, (6) and (7) implies that the value (2) of an employed worker becomes
(r + δ)Wj = wj(x) + λ(U −Wj) (10)
+ max
i∈{0,1}
⎡
⎣i
⎛
⎝φp(θ)
2
X
j0∈{h,l}
max
£
Wj0 −Wj , 0
¤
− s∗τx
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦−R(x)− τx.
Whether an employed worker searches for a new job depends on whether her/his return from
on-the-job search, expressed as φp(θ)/2
P
j0∈{h,l}max
£
Wj0 −Wj , 0
¤
, is larger than the cost of
doing so, expressed as s∗τx. Because
P
j0 max
£
Wj0 −Wh, 0
¤
is always zero, we readily know
that a high-productivity worker will not search for a new job. In contrast, a low-productivity
worker will search for a job if and only if
φp(θ)
2
(Wh −Wl) ≥ s∗τx. (11)
This equation, the left hand side of which expresses the expected capital gain from on-the-job
search and the right hand side is the cost of doing so, is very similar to the equation describing
on-the-job search conditions presented in Pissarides [7]. The difference between the two is that
in (11), the search cost includes the spatial factor whereas the equation in [7] does not do so.
As is often assumed in search models, workers (firms) are assumed to regard θ as given, and
hence, p(θ) (θ and q(θ)) as given, which implies that they take the left hand side of (11) as
given. This implies that a threshold x∗ exists such that a low-productivity worker who lives at
x ≤ x∗ searches for a new job, where x∗ is defined by
x∗ =
φp(θ)(Wh −Wl)
2s∗τ
. (12)
Firms know the productivity and location of their workers, and use this information in
forming their belief i∗. In equilibrium, a firm forms a belief that only unemployed workers
and low-productivity workers with x ≤ x∗ are searching for a job. Letting w1l (x) and w0l (x)
denote the wages of a low productivity worker who is searching for a new job and that of a low
productivity worker who is not, respectively, leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The equilibrium wages satisfy that wh(x) = wh, w
1
l (x) = w
1
l , and w
0
l (x) = w
0
l , ∀x.
Furthermore, the on-the-job search reduces wages by φp(θ)Jl, i.e., w0l = w
1
l + φp(θ)Jl.
Proof See Appendix A.
Intuitively, the asset value of a firm matched with a worker who is searching a new job is
lower than that of a firm matched with a worker who is not by the expected loss φp(θ)Jl caused
by job turnover. The wage differentials compensate for such differentials in the asset value.
2.5 Land market conditions
Based on the assumption that workers can change their locations of residence without incurring
costs, there is no incentive for workers to relocate in equilibrium. Therefore, as shown in (6), in
equilibrium, all employed workers enjoy the same level of value (Wj(x) = W
max
j = Wj) and all
unemployed workers enjoy the same level of value (U(x) = Umax = U). These two conditions
and the wage determination rule (5) imply that the value of a firm is also independent of the
location of its employee (Jj(x) = Jj) as is described in (7).
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In order to determine the equilibrium location of workers, we use the concept of bid rents,
defined as the maximum land rent at location x that each type of worker is willing to pay in
order to reach her/his respective level of equilibrium utility (in this paper, asset value). Note
that in such a framework, the equilibrium asset value of a firm and that of its employee do
not depend on whether the employee is doing on-the-job search. This is due to the adjustment
through land rent and wages. From the definition of bid rents and consideration of Lemma 1
and equations (12), (9) and (10), the bid rents Ω of unemployed and employed worker can be
expressed as follows:
Unemployed workers:
Ωu(x) = b− (r + δ)U − sτx, (13)
Employed low-productivity workers:
Ωl(x) =
½
Ω1l (x) ≡ w1l + λU − (r + δ + λ+ φp(θ)/2)Wl + φp(θ)Wh/2− (1 + s∗)τx if x < x∗
Ω0l (x) ≡ w0l + λU − (r + δ + λ)Wl − τx if x ≥ x∗
,
(14)
Employed high-productivity workers:
Ωh(x) = wh + λU − (r + δ + λ)Wh − τx. (15)
Differentiating (13) and (15) with respect to x, we obtain
∂Ωu
∂x
= −sτ, ∂Ωh
∂x
= −τ.
Ωl(x) is a relatively complex function of x whose slope is described by
∂Ω0l
∂x
=−(1 + s∗)τ, if x ≤ x∗,
∂Ω1l
∂x
=−τ, if x > x∗.
Ωl(x) is discontinuous at x∗ and shifts upwards by φp(θ)Jl, reflecting the decreases in wages
resulting from the firm’s belief that a low-productivity worker who lives at x ≤ x∗ is searching
for a new job and the difference in the bid rent balancing the difference in wages. Put dif-
ferently, from the viewpoint of workers, low productivity employees can commit themselves to
not searching for a job by living farther away from the CBD than x∗. The decline in bid rents
reflects the value of their commitment.
Figure 1 summarizes the above arguments regarding bid rents.
[Figure 1 around here]
In this figure, the horizontal and vertical axis represent the distance from the CBD and the bid
rent, respectively, and the market land rent is the upper envelope of the bid rent curves. From
this figure, the equilibrium locational pattern in the model can be derived as follows:
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, the residential area is separated into four areas. The area closest
to the CBD is occupied by low-productivity workers searching for a new job, the area second
closest is occupied by high-productivity workers, the third closest area by both high-productivity
workers and low-productivity workers not searching for a new job, and the fourth closest (the
most distant) area by unemployed workers.
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The underlying mechanism of this proposition is similar to that of Wasmer and Zenou [15]:
workers locate in descending order of the losses that they incur from living distant from the CBD.
Because Ωl(x) is discontinuous at x∗, there is an area where only high-productivity workers live
between two areas where low productivity workers live.
Let el denote the number of low-productivity workers. Because high-productivity workers
don’t look for a new job, there are only two possibilities: either (i) only a proportion of low-
productivity workers search for a new job (es < el) or (ii) all low-productivity workers search
for a new job (es = el). Based on the possibility of these situations, the bid rents in Figure 1
satisfy the followings:
Ω1l (es) = Ωh(es) and Ωh(N − u) = Ω0l (N − u) = Ωu(N − u) if es < el,
Ω1l (es) = Ωh(es) and Ωh(N − u) = Ωu(N − u) if es = el.
Equations from (13) to (15) together with Ω1l (es) = Ωh(es) and Ωh(N − u) = Ω0l (N − u) yield
wh − w1l − (r + δ + λ)(Wh −Wl) +
φp(θ)
2
(Wl −Wh) + s∗τes = 0, (16)
wh − w0l − (r + δ + λ)(Wh −Wl) = 0. (17)
Substituting (17) into (16), we obtain
w0l − w1l +
φp(θ)
2
(Wl −Wh) + s∗τes = 0.
From (12) and Lemma 1, this equation determines the number es of on-the-job searchers as
es= min
∙
φp(θ)(Wh −Wl − 2Jl)
2s∗τ
,el
¸
= min
∙
x∗ − φp(θ)Jl
s∗τ
, el
¸
(18)
In equilibrium with the interior solution es < el, a certain proportion of the low-productivity
workers are crowded out by high-productivity workers from the interval [x∗−φp(θ)Jl/(s∗τ), x∗],
where they would have searched for a new job if they had resided there. Put differently, x∗ −
es represents the number of low-productivity workers who are crowded out from on-the-job
search. Such a crowding out effect does not exist in the non-spatial on-the-job search model
a la Pissarides [7]. Hereafter, we assume the interior solution (i.e., es < el), whose sufficient
condition will be provided in Lemma 5.
3 Equilibrium
We focus on a steady state equilibrium in which the inflow into unemployment is equal to the
outflow from it:
δN + λ(N − u) = (p(θ) + δ)u,
which yields
u
N
=
δ + λ
δ + λ+ p(θ)
. (19)
Lemma 2 For a given market tightness θ, the unemployment rate does not depend on the city
size N .
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The free-entry condition (8) can be rewritten as
c
q(θ)|{z}
expected total search costs
=
1
2
(Jh + Jl) (20)
=
1
2
yl − w0l + yh − wh
r + δ + λ
=
1
r + δ + λ
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
yh + yl
2| {z }
expected output
− wh + w
0
l
2| {z }
expected wage
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
which connects market tightness θ to wages wh and w0l .
Wages wh and w
0
l can be derived from asset value functions. Equations (3) and (10) can be
rewritten as the followings by using V = 0:
(r + δ + λ)Jh = yh − wh, (21)
(r + δ + λ)Jl = yl − w0l if x > x∗,
(r + δ + λ)(Wh − U) = wh − (r + δ)U − τx−R(x),
(r + δ + λ)(Wl − U) = w0l − (r + δ)rU − τx−R(x) if x > x∗.
Substituting these equations and (9) into (5), we obtain9
wh = β(yh + cθ) + (1− β) [b+ (1− s)τ(N − u)] , (22)
w0l = β(yl + cθ) + (1− β) [b+ (1− s)τ (N − u)] .
In these equations, wages are increasing functions of market tightness θ. For a given θ, the
wages increase with an increase in productivity and the value of leisure, in accordance with the
findings of Pissarides [7], as well as with an increase in the commuting cost τ and N − u, and
decrease with an increase in the search frequency of unemployed workers s, all of which are
common characteristics of spatial search models (see Zenou [18]). Lemma 1 and (22) yield the
wages of an on-the-job searcher w1l :
w1l = β(yl + cθ) + (1− β) [b+ (1− s)τ(N − u)]− φp(θ)Jl
= β(yl + cθ) + (1− β) [b+ (1− s)τ(N − u)]− φp(θ)
(1− β) [yl − b− (1− s)τ(N − u)]− βcθ
r + δ + λ
,
which is a decreasing function of on-the-job search efficiency φ for a given θ.
The expected wage is obtained from (22) as follows:
wh + w
0
l
2
=
β(yh + yl)
2
+ βcθ + (1− β) [b+ (1− s)τ(N − u)] . (23)
Equations (19), (20) and (23) are used to determine u, θ and (wh + w0l )/2, and other variables
(i.e. w1l , es) are well determined from them.
9From (5) and V = 0, it is readily shown that workers prefer to be employed rather than unemployed if and
only if Jj > 0 (j ∈ {h, l}). From (21) and (22), the sufficient condition for this inequality to hold true is given by
yl − w0l > 0,
which can be rewritten as
(1− β) [yl − b− (1− s)τ(N − u)] > βcθ.
Under this condition, Jh > Jl > 0 holds true, that is, even a bad match gives positive profits to a firm, implying
that any type of match is maintained under this condition.
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Substituting (19) into (23) yields
wh + w
0
l
2
=
β(yh + yl)
2
+ βcθ + (1− β)
∙
b+ (1− s)τN
µ
1− δ + λ
δ + λ+ p(θ)
¶¸
, (24)
from which it can be observed that the market tightness θ affects the expected wage via two
channels. In one channel, a higher θ implies the existence of better outside opportunities,
thus giving workers a better bargaining position. In the other channel, a higher θ leads to a
higher employment rate, which increases the total commuting costs of employed workers and,
by increasing the relative attractiveness of outside opportunities, increases wages.
Figure 2 depicts (20) and (24) with the horizontal axis representing the market tightness
θ, vertical axis representing the expected wage (wh + w0l )/2. The the downward-sloping curve
describes (20) and the upward-sloping curve describes (24).
[Figure 2 around here]
From the Inada condition regarding matching technology, the two curves always has the
unique intersection, implying that the model has the unique steady state equilibrium.
Proposition 2 There exists the unique steady state equilibrium of the model.
Using Figure 2, the effects of a change in exogenous variables can be determined,
Lemma 3 The labor market tightness θ decreases and the expected wage (wh+w0l )/2 increases
as the city size N or the commuting cost τ increases, and as the commuting frequency s of
off-the-job search increases.
As described in (24), an increase in τ or N (a decrease in s) increases the expected wages
for a given θ, which reduces both the profit of posting a vacancy and θ.
This change in θ, in turn, affects the threshold location x∗ of on-the-job searchers and the
number es of on-the-job searchers. To examine this, we need to know the expression ofWh−Wl.
From (21), we know that
Wh −Wl =
wh − w0l
r + δ + λ
=
β(yh − yl)
r + δ + λ
.
Substituting this equation into (12), we obtain
x∗ =
φp(θ)β(yh − yl)
2s∗τ(r + δ + λ)
> 0. (25)
Lemma 4 There is always a non-empty interval [0, x∗] such that low-productivity workers who
live within it look for a new job. The threshold of the interval x∗ decreases with an increases in
the city size N , the commuting cost τ and the commuting frequency s∗ of on-the-job search, and
increases with an increase in the commuting frequency s of off-the-job search.
As is observed directly from (25), an increase in s∗ or τ leads to a higher cost of on-the-job
search and a decrease in the threshold x∗. An increase in N , τ or s indirectly affects x∗ by
changing θ.
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From (21), it can be observed that Jl =
¡
yl − w0l
¢
/(r + δ + λ). Substituting this equation
as well as (22) and (25) into (18), we obtain
es =
φp(θ)
s∗τ(r + δ + λ)
∙
β (yh − yl)
2
− yl + w0l
¸
(26)
=
φp(θ)
s∗τ(r + δ + λ)
½
β (yh + yl)
2
− yl + βcθ + (1− β) [b+ (1− s)τ (N − u)]
¾
,
which demonstrates the existence of three possible cases described in Lemma 5:
Lemma 5 In equilibrium, (i) a certain proportion of low-productivity workers search for a new
job:
es =
φp(θ)
s∗τ(r + δ + λ)
∙
β (yh − yl)
2
− yl + w0l
¸
, if w0l > yl −
β (yh − yl)
2
,
(ii) no employed worker looks for a new job:
es = 0, if w
0
l ≤ yl −
β (yh − yl)
2
,
(iii) all low-productivity workers seek for a new job:
es = el, if
φp(θ)
s∗τ (r + δ + λ)
∙
β (yh − yl)
2
− yl + w0l
¸
≥ el.
The remainder of this paper focuses on the most interesting case (i). From (26), the following
proposition can be derived:
Proposition 3 The number es of on-the-job searchers decreases as the commuting frequency
s∗ of on-the-job search or the commuting cost τ increases, whereas the city size N and the
commuting frequency s of off-the-job search have an ambiguous effect on es.
An increase in N or τ , or a decrease in s affects es through two channels: (i) by leading to
a decrease in θ, which as shown in Lemma 3, or (ii) by leading to an increase in wage w0l , as
confirmed by Lemma 3 and (22). Such changes in θ and w0l have the following impacts on x
∗
and the crowding out effect x∗ − es, which is given by
x∗ − es =
φp(θ)Jl
s∗τ
=
φp(θ)
¡
yl − w0l
¢
s∗τ (r + δ + λ)
.
From this and (25), we know that a decrease in θ lowers both x∗ and x∗−es whereas an increase
in w0l has no impacts on x
∗ but reduces x∗ − es. Hence, an increase in w0l leads to an increase
in es, while a decrease in θ has an ambiguous effect on es. An increase in N or a decrease in s
affects es only through these two channels, implying that the effects of N and s are ambiguous.
An increase in τ has another negative direct effect on es for any θ and this effect dominates the
other effects. An increase in s∗ has only the direct negative effect on es.
We next provide the comparative steady-state analysis regarding the importance of on-the-
job search in the economy. To see this, we focus on the proportion of on-the-job searchers
among all workers and among low-productivity workers. From (19) and (26), the proportion of
on-the-job searchers among all workers becomes as
es
N
=
φp(θ)
s∗τ(r + δ + λ)
½
1
N
∙
β (yh + yl)
2
− yl + βcθ
¸
+ (1− β)
∙
b
N
+
(1− s)τp(θ)
δ + λ+ p(θ)
¸¾
,
from which the following proposition can be derived:
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Proposition 4 An increase in the city size N , the commuting frequency s∗ of on-the-job search,
or the commuting cost τ leads to a decrease in the proportion of on-the-job searchers among all
workers, whereas an increase in the commuting frequency s of off-the-job search has an ambiguous
effect on it.
According to Proposition 3, an increase in s∗ or τ leads to a decrease in es, implying a lower
es/N . Although the effect of N or s on es is ambiguous, the effect of N on the denominator of
es/N is prominent and thus es/N decreases as N increases.
The steady-state condition for the number el of low-productivity workers becomes
up(θ)
2
= (λ+ δ)el +
φp(θ)es
2
,
where the left hand represents the inflow to the pool of low-productivity workers from the pool
of unemployed workers and the right hand side represents the outflow of workers due to the
exogenous shocks and job turnover. Combining this equation with (19) yields
el =
p(θ)
2
µ
N
δ + λ+ p(θ)
− φes
δ + λ
¶
.
The steady-state condition for the number eh of high productivity workers is given by
up(θ)
2
+
φp(θ)x∗
2
= (λ+ δ)eh,
where the left hand side represents the inflow of low-productivity and unemployed workers into
the pool of high-productivity workers and the right hand side represents the outflow of high-
productivity workers solely due to exogenous shocks.10 Combining this equation with (19) yields
eh =
p(θ)
2
µ
N
δ + λ+ p(θ)
+
φes
δ + λ
¶
.
Hence, we now have the proportion of each type of employed workers among all workers:
el
N
=
p(θ)
2(δ + λ)
µ
u
N
− φes
N
¶
, (27)
eh
N
=
p(θ)
2(δ + λ)
µ
u
N
+
φes
N
¶
.
When the proportion of on-the-job searchers es/N increases, job turnover increases, raising the
proportion of high-productivity workers and lowering the proportion of low-productivity workers.
Finally, the proportion of on-the-job searchers among the low-productivity workers can be
derived from (27) as follows:
es
el
=
2(δ + λ)es
p(θ)(u− φes)
=
2(δ + λ)(δ + λ+ p(θ))es
p(θ) [(δ + λ)N − (δ + λ+ p(θ))φes]
.
which readily leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 5 An increase in the commuting frequency s∗ of on-the-job search decreases the
proportion of on-the-job seekers among the low-productivity workers. So does an increase in the
city size N or in the commuting cost τ if (δ + λ+ p(θ))φp(θ) > (δ + λ)2.
10Note that no high-productivity workers look for a new position.
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Although an increase in s∗ leads to a decrease in es, it does not affect θ, implying that an
increase in s∗ leads to a decrease in the proportion es/el. Having observed that an increase in
τ or N leads to a decrease in both p(θ) and es/N , it can now be observed that a decrease in
es/N always leads to a decrease in es/el. From the partial differentiation of es/el with respect
to p(θ), the following can be derived to demonstrate that an increase in N or τ decreases the
proportion of on-the-job searchers among low-productivity workers, as stated in Proposition 5:
∂es/el
∂p(θ)
> 0⇔ (δ + λ+ p(θ))φp(θ) > (δ + λ)2.
When the number of each type of worker can be determined, the market land rent function
can be derived as follows:
R =
⎧
⎨
⎩
(1 + s)τ (es − x) + τ (N − u− es) + sτu if x ∈ (0, es)
τ(N − u− x) + sτu if x ∈ [es, N − u]
sτ(N − u) if x ∈ (N − u,N ]
.
4 Efficiency
This section derives the first and second best optimal allocations and compares them to the
equilibrium allocation described in the previous section, using the social surplus SS as the
criterion of welfare.
Second-best optimal allocation
We start from the analysis of the second-best optimal allocation, in which social planners can de-
termine workers’ locations and whether they look for a new job although the market tightness is
determined by the free-entry condition. As shown in Appendix B, the second-best optimal allo-
cation requires that workers live in the same areas in which they would do so in the equilibrium.
Hence, the welfare function (the social surplus) is given by
SS =
Z
exp[−rt]
"
yheh + ylel + bu| {z }
output
−cθ(u+ φe∗∗s )| {z }
search costs
−
Z e∗∗s
0
(1 + s∗)τxdx−
Z N−u
e∗∗s
τxdx−
Z N
N−u
sτxdx| {z }
commuting costs
#
dt,
where e∗∗s is the number of on-the-job searchers as determined by the social planner. SS consists
of the output from matches, search costs, and commuting costs. The social planner’s problem
in the second-best optimal allocation is then defined as
max
e∗∗s
SS (28)
s.t.
deh
dt
=
up(θ)
2
+
φp(θ)
2
e∗∗s − (δ + λ)eh,
du
dt
= δN + λ(N − u)− (δ + p(θ))u,
c
q(θ)
=
1
r + δ + λ
½
(1− β)
∙
yh + yl
2
− b− (1− s)τ(N − u)
¸
− βcθ
¾
,
where the first constraint describes the law of motion of the number of high productivity workers,
the second constraint describes the law of motion of the number of unemployed workers, and the
third constraint is the free-entry condition. Here, it is assumed that unemployment is socially
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undesirable, or more precisely, that the shadow price of unemployment is negative.11 Without
this assumption, the social planner may prefer leaving workers unemployed rather than inducing
them to form bad matches and shut bad matches down.
As shown in Appendix C, the optimal number of on-the-job searchers is given by
e∗∗s =
φ
s∗τ
∙
p(θ)(yh − yl)
2 (r + δ + λ)
− cθ
¸
, (29)
which satisfies the following property:
Proposition 6 For any θ, the equilibrium number of on-the-job searchers is equal to the optimal
number (i.e., es = e
∗∗
s must hold true).
Proof See Appendix D.
In a standard on-the-job search model a la Pissarides [7], the number of on-the-job searchers
in equilibrium is larger than that in the optimum. Here, spatial crowding out by high-productivity
workers reduces the number of on-the-job seekers, leading to the attainment of the second best
allocation, i.e., there is no distortion in decision regarding on-the-job search.
Put differently, the equilibrium decision regarding on-the-job search that is described in (18)
maximizes the total surplus of forming a match with low-productivity workers, with the total
surplus given by
(r + δ)(Wl(x) + Jl(x)− U)
=
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
yl − (r + δ)U + λ(U −Wl − Jl)
+ φp(θ) (Wh −Wl − 2Jl) /2− s∗τx
if the employed worker
looks for a new job
yl − (r + δ)U + λ(U −Wl − Jl) otherwise
.
Therefore, as long as φp(θ)(Wh−Wl−2Jl)/2 is larger than the search cost s∗τx, on-the-job search
increases the total surplus, implying that the equilibrium decision regarding on-the-job search
maximizes the surplus. In the absence of spatial structure, low-productivity (bad matched)
workers initiate on-the-job search if the search cost is smaller than φp(θ)(Wh −Wl)/2, which
yields a larger number of on-the-job searchers than is optimal.
4.1 First-best optimal allocation
Having demonstrated that decision regarding on-the-job search is efficient, the next question is
whether the free-entry condition leads to the optimal number of vacancies. This consideration is
addressed by comparing the equilibrium to the first-best optimal allocation, in which the social
planner can choose the market tightness θ as well as the number of on-the-job searchers e∗∗s .
The corresponding problem can be expressed as:
max
e∗∗s ,θ
SS
s.t.
deh
dt
=
up(θ)
2
+
φp(θ)
2
e∗∗s − (δ + λ)eh,
du
dt
= δN + λ(N − u)− (δ + p(θ))u.
As shown in Appendix E, the optimality condition is given by
cθ =
θp0(θ)
r + δ + λ+ p(θ)− uθp0(θ)/(u+ φe∗∗s )
(30)
×
∙µ
r + δ + λ+
φe∗∗s p(θ)
u+ φe∗∗s
¶
yh − yl
2(r + δ + λ)
+ [yl − b− (1− s)τ(N − u)]
u
u+ φe∗∗s
¸
.
11See Appendix C.
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In the absence of on-the-job search, as shown inWasmer and Zenou [15] and Zenou [18], even with
consideration of the spatial structure, the Hosios condition (Hosios [4]) ensures the equilibrium
to be optimal, i.e., the free-entry condition (20) coincides to (30) when β = −θq0(θ)/q(θ) (=
1 − θp0(θ)/p(θ)) holds true: by substituting φ = 0 and β = 1 − θp0(θ)/p(θ) into (20) and (30),
we obtain12
cθ =
θp0(θ)
r + δ + λ+ p− θp0(θ)
∙
yh + yl
2
− b− (1− s)τ(N − u)
¸
. (31)
However, in the presence of on-the-job search, the optimal θ under the Hosios condition is given
by (30) although (20) under the Hosios condition becomes (31), which determines the equilibrium
tightness. As shown in Appendix F, the right hand side of (30) is smaller than the right hand
side of (20) for a given θ. In contrast, the left hand side is the same for both the equilibrium
and the optimum. These loci are described in Figure 3.
[Figure 3 around here]
From Figure 3, we can readily see that the equilibrium value of θ is larger than the optimal
value of θ.
Proposition 7 In the presence of on-the-job search, vacancies are over-provided in the equilib-
rium under the Hosios condition.
As social benefits derived from making a new job match is smaller for on-the-job search than
for off-the-job search, the optimal value of the market tightness θ decreases when the on-the-job
search is possible. In contrast, the equilibrium value of θ is determined independently of whether
φ > 0, which is the result of spatial arbitrage among employed workers.
5 Concluding remarks
This study investigated the nature and impacts of the interaction between the structure of a
city and the on-the-job search. In equilibrium, workers relocate within a city correspondingly
to their career turnover. Unemployed workers relocate from the outskirts of city to the inner
regions of the city when they land a job. Employed workers must determine whether to search
for a new job. If an employed worker searches, she/he lives most proximate to the CBD. If not,
she/he resides inbetween the unemployed workers and on-the-job searchers. Thus, the model
proposed in this paper provides a tool to analyze the simultaneous determination of career and
relocation paths. Efficiency analysis demonstrated that although the decision to post a job
vacancy is distorted by the introduction of the spatial structure, decision regarding on-the-job
search is efficient.
A few comments are in order. First, in the model presented here, the spatial dimension of on-
the-job search appears only on the cost side of a job search. However, the spatial concentration
of job searchers and vacancies may lead to agglomeration economies (Sato [10] and Wheeler
[16]), the importance of which has already been noted by Marshall [6]. As is always true
for economics analysis, balanced consideration of the costs and benefits must be given, and
therefore examination of the effects of introducing the benefits of on-the-job search within a city
is warranted. Second, the model is a closed city model in which the population size of the city is
exogenous. However, if the benefits of concentration of job-seekers and vacancies outweighs the
costs of it, a large city will attract more workers and firms. It is therefore particularly important
to investigate the resulting distribution of economic activities in a multi-city world. Finally, for
the sake of analytical tractability, this model considered only two levels of productivity, high
12Note that es = 0 when φ = 0.
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and low, which led to the development of an over-simplified wage distribution based on only
three possible values. Future research efforts should introduce a continuous wage distribution a
la Burdett and Mortensen [2]. All these are important directions in the future research.
Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1
Start with the wages paid to a good-match worker. Because i∗ = 0 for Jh, (3), V = 0 and
(7) imply that
wh(x) = wh ≡ yh − (λ+ δ + r)Jh, ∀x.
Similar arguments for the wages paid to a bad-match worker imply that
w1l (x) = w
1
l ≡ yl − (λ+ δ + r + φp(θ))Jl, ∀x.
w0l (x) = w
0
l ≡ yl − (λ+ δ + r)Jl, ∀x.
Hence, we obtain the results:
w0l − w1l = φp(θ)Jl.
Appendix B: The location patterns in the first and second best optimal allocation
This appendix shows that in the optimal allocation, on-the-job searchers live closet to the
CBD, employed non-job searchers live next closest to the CBD, and unemployed workers live
most distant from the CBD.
Consider two workers A and B, whose commuting costs are τA and τB, respectively. Assume
that τA > τB and denote their locations by xA and xB, respectively. We show by contradiction
that xA < xB must hold true in the optimal allocation.
Suppose now that xA > xB holds true in the optimal allocation and let∆ denote xA−xB > 0.
Then, by interchanging their location, the total commuting costs in the economy changes by
−τA∆ + τB∆ = (τB − τA)∆ < 0. This contradicts the definition of the optimal allocation.
Hence, xA < xB must hold true, i.e., workers with higher commuting costs must locate closer
to the CBD in the optimal allocation, which is the same location pattern as that described in
Proposition 1.
Appendix C: Derivation of the second-best optimal allocation
As the free-entry condition in (28) determines θ as a function of u, it can be denoted as θ(u).
Using this expression, the welfare function can be rewritten as
SS =
Z
exp[−rt]
"
yheh + ylel + bu− cθ(u)(u+ φe∗∗s )
−
Z e∗∗s
0
(1 + s∗)τxdx−
Z N−u
e∗∗s
τxdx−
Z N
N−u
sτxdx
#
dt,
which implies that (28) becomes
max
e∗∗s
SS
s.t.
deh
dt
=
up(θ(u))
2
+
φp(θ(u))
2
e∗∗s − (δ + λ)eh,
du
dt
= δN + λ(N − u)− (δ + p(θ(u)))u,
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Noting that el = N − u− eh, the present-value Hamiltonian is defined as
H = exp[−rt]
"
yheh + yl(N − u− eh) + bu− cθ(u)(u+ φe∗∗s )−
Z e∗∗s
0
(1 + s∗)τxdx
−
Z N−u
e∗∗s
τxdx−
Z N
N−u
sτxdx
#
+ μg
∙
p(θ(u))
2
(u+ φe∗∗s )− (δ + λ)eh
¸
+ μu [δN + λ(N − u)− (δ + p(θ(u)))u] .
Note here that the control variable is e∗∗s and the state variables are eh and u. The optimality
conditions are
e∗∗s : 0 =
∂H
∂e∗∗s
, (32)
eh :
dμg
dt
= −∂H
∂eh
,
u :
dμu
dt
= −∂H
∂u
.
By solving the three equations in (32), we obtain
0 = exp[−rt](−cθφ− s∗τe∗∗s ) + μg
φp(θ)
2
, (33)
μg = exp[−rt]
yh − yl
r + δ + λ
,
μu = − exp[−rt]
(r + δ + λ) [yl − b+ cθ − (1− s)τ(N − u)]− p(θ)(yh − yl)/2
(r + δ + λ)(λ+ r + δ + p(θ))
,
which determine the optimal number of on-the-job searchers:
e∗∗s =
φ
s∗τ
∙
p(θ)(yh − yl)
2 (r + δ + λ)
− cθ
¸
.
The regularity condition that the social planner prefers employment to unemployment is then
given by
μu < 0 ⇔
p(θ)(yh − yl)
2(r + δ + λ)
< yl − b+ cθ − (1− s)τ(N − u), (34)
and we assume that this inequality holds true.
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 6
Substituting the free entry condition in (28) into (29), yields
e∗∗s =
φp(θ)
s∗τ (r + δ + λ)
½
yh − yl
2
− (1− β)yh + yl
2
+ βcθ + (1− β) [b+ (1− s)τ(N − u)]
¾
=
φp(θ)
s∗τ(r + δ + λ)
½
β (yh + yl)
2
− yl + βcθ + (1− β) [b+ (1− s)τ(N − u)]
¾
,
which is equal to (26).
Appendix E: Derivation of the first-best optimal allocation
In the first-best optimal allocation, the social planner can choose the market tightness θ as
well as the number of on-the-job searchers e∗∗s . The corresponding problem can be expressed as:
max
e∗∗s ,θ
SS
s.t.
deh
dt
=
up(θ)
2
+
φp(θ)
2
e∗∗s − (δ + λ)eh,
du
dt
= δN + λ(N − u)− (δ + p(θ))u,
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The present-value Hamiltonian is defined as
H = exp[−rt]
"
yheh + yl(N − u− eh) + bu− cθ(u+ φe∗∗s )−
Z e∗∗s
0
(1 + s∗)τxdx
−
Z N−u
e∗∗s
τxdx−
Z N
N−u
sτxdx
#
+ μg
∙
p(θ)
2
(u+ φe∗∗s )− (δ + λ)eh
¸
+ μu [δN + λ(N − u)− (δ + p(θ))u] .
The optimality conditions are
e∗∗s : 0 =
∂H
∂e∗∗s
,
θ : 0 =
∂H
∂θ
,
eh :
dμg
dt
= −∂H
∂eh
,
u :
dμu
dt
= −∂H
∂u
.
A new condition now exists
θ : e−rtc =
μgp0(θ)
2
− μup
0(θ)u
u+ φe∗∗s
.
Solving the optimality condition yields
c
p0(θ)
=
yh − yl
2(r + δ + λ)
+
1
r + δ + λ+ p(θ)
∙
yl − b+ cθ − (1− s)τ(N − u)−
p(θ)(yh − yl)
2(r + δ + λ)
¸
u
u+ φe∗∗s
,
Appendix F: The loci of the right hand sides of (30) and (31) in Figure 3
Note that (30) becomes (31) when φ = 0. When φ > 0, (30) can be rewritten as
cθ =
θp0(θ)
r + δ + λ+ p(θ)− θp0(θ)(1−A) (35)
×
½
(r + δ + λ+ p(θ)A)
yh − yl
2(r + δ + λ)
+ (1−A) [yl − b− (1− s)τ (N − u)]
¾
,
where A = φe∗∗s /(u + φe
∗∗
s ). Note that ∂A/∂φ > 0 for a given θ. Let Φ denote the right hand
side of (35). For a given θ, a change in A affects Φ in the following manner:
∂Φ
∂A
=
θp0(θ)
r + δ + λ+ p(θ)− θp0(θ)(1−A)
½
p(θ) (yh − yl)
2(r + δ + λ)
− [yl − b− (1− s)τ(N − u)]− Φ
¾
.
Because (34) is assumed to hold, ∂Φ/∂A < 0 is obtained, and hence ∂Φ/∂φ = (∂Φ/∂A)(∂A/∂φ) <
0 for a given θ. This fact, combined with the fact that (30) becomes (31) when φ = 0, demon-
strates that the right hand side of (30) is smaller than that of (31) for any θ when φ > 0, as
described in Figure 3.
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Figure 1: Bid rent curves
Figure 2: Equilibrium of the model
21
Figure 3: The value of market tightness: Equilibrium v.s. the first best
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